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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Confrontation Clause and the New
"Primary Purpose Test" in Domestic Violence Cases; Davis v.Washington,

126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
Monica Vozakis *
INTRODUCTION

On February 1,2001, Michelle McCottry dialed 911 and then quickly hung
up.' Since hang-ups often indicate grave danger, the 911 operator immediately
returned the call. 2 A hysterical and sobbing McCottry answered and told the
operator, "He's here jumpin' on me again." 3 The operator ask McCottry who
the attacker was, the relationship she had with the attacker, and if alcohol was
involved. 4 McCottry identified her attacker as Adrian Davis and told the operator
he had beaten her with his fists and had just left. 5 She also informed the operator
she had a protective order against him. 6 When law enforcement officers arrived
at the scene, Davis was no longer at the house, and McCottry was frantically
gathering belongings so she and her children could leave. 7 McCottry had "fresh
injuries on her forearm and her face." 8
The State arrested Davis and charged him with felony violation of a domestic
no-contact order.9 McCottry originally assisted the prosecutor's office, but at the
time of trial, they were unable to locate her.'l Instead, the two police officers
who responded to the scene were the only State witnesses."1 They testified about
McCottry's recent injuries but said they did not know what caused them. 12 While
McCottry herself did not testify, the trial court allowed her 911 conversation to
be admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception. 13 Davis objected and
*University of Wyoming College of Law J.D. Candidate, 2008. I'd like to thank my husband,
Marc, and my son, McCoy, for their love and support.
' State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005).
Id.at 846, 850.

2

3Id.at 846 (quoting Ex. 2 (911 audiotape)).

'Davis, 111 P.3d at 846.
5
Id.
6 Id.at 846-47.

7Id.at 847.
Sd.

9 Davis, 111 P.3d at 847; WASH. REv. CODE § 26.50.110(1), (4) (1984) (McCottry had a
no-contact order against Davis in which "[a]ny assault.., is a violation of an order.").
'0 Davis, 111 P.3d at 847.
11Id.
12Id.
13Id. (The court denied a proposed jury instruction on McCottry's absence.); WASH. R. EVID.
803 (a)(2); FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (The Washington state rule of evidence and the federal rule of
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claimed entering the 911 call as evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witness against him, but the trial court admitted the 911 tape, and
the jury convicted Davis of felony violation of a domestic no-contact order. 14
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Davis'
Sixth Amendment objection and decide when evidence taken by law enforcement
should be admitted at trial without a prior opportunity for cross-examination.15
The Court previously differentiated between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements in applying the Sixth Amendment and determined that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to non-testimonial statements.16 Furthermore, the
Court took the opportunity in this case to clarify what makes a statement testimonial as opposed to non-testimonial. 17 The Court upheld Davis' conviction, ruling
18
the evidence was admissible because the statement was non-testimonial.
The U.S. Supreme Court combined the Davis case with Hammon v. Indiana,
which presented a similar issue, but had distinguishable facts. 9 In Hammon, the
police responded to a "domestic disturbance" at the home of Hershel and Amy
Hammon. 2° When the police arrived, Amy was on the front porch and, although
she appeared to be fearful, she told the officers "everything was okay."21 She let
the officers enter the home where they found an overturned heater. 22 The officers
spoke to Hershel who said he and Amy had an argument, but it was not physical.23
One officer talked with Amy in the living room, while the other officer made
Hershel stay in the kitchen. 24 The officer talking to Amy did not see any physical
injuries, although Amy said she was in some pain. 25 Amy filled out an affidavit
stating: "Broke our furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass.
Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my
26
van where I couldn't leave the house. Attacked my daughter."

evidence are the same and state: "A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.").
4

Davis, 111 P.3d at 847.
15Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270
(2006).
16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
'U

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.

11Id.at 2277, 2280.
'9Id.at 2266.
20Hammon
21

v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446-47 (Ind.2005).

Id. at 446-47.

22Id.at 447.
23

Id.

Id.; Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2272 (2006).
25Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind. Ct.App. 2004).
24

26

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
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"The State charged Hershel with domestic battery and with violating his
probation." 27Although Amy did not testify at trial, the court entered her affidavit
as evidence under the present sense impression hearsay exception.2 8 The responding police officer testified to Amy's oral statements, which the court admitted
into evidence under the excited utterance hearsay exception. 2 9 Hershel objected,
arguing that his Sixth Amendment confrontation right had been violated." At a
bench trial, the court convicted Hershel on both charges." The Indiana Court
of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction holding that
Amy's oral statement to the police officer was an "excited utterance" and, therefore, not testimonial.3 2 The Indiana Supreme Court also held Amy's affidavit to
be testimonial.33 Admitting the affidavit as evidence, however, was harmless error
because the trial was to the bench. 4
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Amy's oral statement to
the police officer and affidavit were testimonial, and the lower court violated
Hershel's right to cross-examine the witness against him. 35 The Court reversed his
conviction.36
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved both cases, consolidated in Davis v.
Washington.3 7 It used the case to address troubling issues related to the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause that remained after its 2004 decision in

27

Id; IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (2000) ("A person who knowingly or intentionally touches an

individual who (1) is or was a spouse of the other person ... in a rude, insolvent, or angry manner
that results in bodily injury .... ").
28 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272; IND. R. EvID. 803 (1) (1994) ("Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining a material event, condition or transaction, made while the declarant
was perceiving the event, condition or transaction, or immediately thereafter.").
29 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272; IND. R. EVID. 803(2) (1994) ("Excited utterances. A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of the
excitement caused by the event or condition.").
3' Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
1' Id. at 2273.
32 Hammon v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 945, 950, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Hammon v. State,
829 N.E.2d 444, 449, 456-58 (Ind. 2005).
33 Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 458. "The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the affidavit
was properly admitted, reasoning that the issue was academic because the affidavit was cumulative
of Mooney's testimony and therefore harmless, if error at all." Id. at 448; Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at
948 n.l.
34

Id. at 459.

35 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005), cert. granted; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.

2266, 2278-80 (2006).
36 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
37 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005), cert. granted; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.

2266, 2270 (2006).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 2, Art. 9
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

Crawford v.Washington." In Crawford, the Court held the Confrontation Clause
prohibits the use of "testimonial" statements that are not (or have not been)
subject to cross-examination.3 9 The Court did not, however, give a precise definition of "testimonial."4 ° In Davis, the Court took a step in clarifying what sort
of statements are testimonial by specifically addressing police interrogations." It
found that not all interrogations made by police would qualify as testimonial.42
Instead, a court must objectively consider the reason and circumstances under
which the statement was given to determine whether it is testimonial. 43 If the
statement serves to request help in an ongoing emergency, as in McCottry's 911
call, then the statement is non-testimonial. 44 But if the statement is part of an
investigation of possible past crimes, it would be considered testimonial regardless
of the level of formality used in securing the statement. 45 Thus, after Davis, the
courts will have to determine the primary purpose of the police interrogation
before it can rule on whether the statement will be admissible as evidence under
46
the Confrontation Clause.
This note first discusses the background of the Confrontation Clause and
how Confrontation Clause analysis evolved from a close relationship with hearsay rules to a complete separation from hearsay analysis in Crawford. The note
will next discuss the "primary purpose test" articulated in Davis in determining
which statements taken by police at the scene will be admissible as evidence and
which will not. It will then review some issues with the test that will need further
clarification by the Court, and it will also discuss the alternative "formality test"
proposed by the dissent. Since both cases involved in Davis are rooted in domestic
violence, the note will examine the dramatic effect the current doctrine will have
on domestic violence cases, including difficulty in prosecuting the cases.47 Finally,
the note will explore how the forfeiture doctrine could remedy some of the problems in domestic violence cases where the victim does not testify as a result of the
defendant's threats and intimidation.
Is Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
31Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
" Id. ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.").
"' Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270.
42 Id.at 2273-74.
13Id.at 2273-74, 2277.

1 Id.at 2273-74, 2276-77.
" Id, at 2276.
46 Id.at 2273-74.
47 Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions after
Crawford, 20 CIUM. JUST. 24, 25 (2005). Reports from news agencies shortly after Crawfordindicated prosecutors were forced to drop nearly fifty percent of domestic violence prosecutions since an
estimated eighty percent of victims refused to cooperate. Id.
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BACKGROUND

The right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him is one that has
existed since the Roman era, but has evolved considerably over time.48 England's
early civil law system, for example, allowed judges to examine witnesses before
trials in private without the defendant present and later admit the out-of-court
examinations into the trial as evidence.49 This practice later moved to the opposite
extreme and prevented out-of-court statements from being admitted at all. 50 The
American colonies also had questionable confrontation practices. 5' When the
U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789 without a provision to allow the accused
to confront a witness against him, part of the ratification agreement included an
understanding that a Bill of Rights would be added.52 In 1791, the first Congress

" Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1015 (1988). The Roman judicial system was adversarial, much
like the United States, and the primary means of proving a case was through witness testimony.
Frank R. Herrmann, S.J., & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient andMedievalPrecursors
of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 484 (1994). Although different social classes
were sometimes afforded different treatment, one of the basic rights afforded all defendants was a
right to confront a witness against them. Id. at 485. According to Roman Governor Festus, "[i]t is
not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers
face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges." Id. at 482 (quoting
Acts ofthe Apostles 25:16).
49 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44.
50Id. at 44-45. A change in England's civil law court system in the late 1600s generally excluding hearsay was due in part to the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, one of England's great explorers
and a hero, who was charged with treason for conspiring with Spain to overthrow King James. Id. at
44. Raleigh's alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, testified in front of a "Privy Council" and later
wrote a letter that implicated Raleigh in an effort for Cobham to try to save himself. Id. at 44; Alan
Raphael, When Can a Witness's Statements Be Admitted Into Evidence Without the Witness First Taking
the Stand, 6 PREVIEW 292 (2006). At Raleigh's trial, the court admitted Cobham's prior testimony
and letter without Cobham's direct testimony. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. Raleigh protested that
he did not have the opportunity to confront Cobham and that, although Cobham had lied in his
prior testimony and letter, he would not lie to Raleigh's face. Id. Raleigh was convicted of treason
and sentenced to death. Id; Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation:Its History and Modern
Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 388-89 (1959). After this tragedy, English statutes and judicial decisions
reformed the laws, granting the "right of confrontation." Crawford,541 U.S. at 44; Pollitt, 8 J. PUB.
L. at 388. The English law was changed to require face-to-face testimony. Raphael, 6 PREviEw at
292. The Court of the King's Bench later went so far as to rule that if a witness was not available for
cross-examination, his testimony would not be admitted as evidence, even if the witness were dead.
Crawfrrd,541 U.S. at 44 (citing King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163 (1696)).
11Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-48 (relating how in the eighteenth century, the Virginia Council
objected to the Governor hearing testimony privately without giving the accused access to the witnesses); Pollitt, supra note 50, at 396-97 (noting that before the Revolution, colonial courts heard
cases involving violations of the Stamp Act in which the courts questioned and disposed of witnesses
in private judicial proceedings); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (noting that many states adopted the right
of confrontation in their state constitutions, although the federal constitution did not originally
have this right); Id. (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the FederalFarmer (Oct. 15, 1787)) (relating
criticism by a colonist that the proposed U.S. Constitution did not secure the right to cross-examine
witnesses in front of the fact-finders).
52 Crawford,541 U.S. at 49; Pollitt, supra note 50, at 399-400.
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kept its promise and passed the Bill of Rights which included the Confrontation
Clause in the Sixth Amendment. 53 The Sixth Amendment reads, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."54

Pre-Roberts Era
One of the first cases interpreting the Confrontation Clause, Mattox v. United
States, was heard in 1895.15 Two witnesses testified at an earlier trial concerning
the same crime but died before the second.5 6 In affirming the murder conviction,
the Court held that allowing the reporter to read the deceased testimony from
the earlier trial was proper.5 7 The Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause
prevented evidence from entering a trial when the defendant was not allowed
to cross-examine the witness, but since the defendant cross-examined the witnesses in the earlier trial, there was no constitutional violation. 5 The Court also
acknowledged that face-to-face confrontation allowed the fact-finders to deter" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49, 53-54; Pollitt, supra note 50, at 399-400 (stating that the basic
purpose of the Sixth Amendment was to ensure the state could not take certain rights from a person
faced with criminal charges).
54U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49-50 (2004) (relating
that many early courts interpreted the Confrontation Clause to mean the accused should have the
opportunity to confront a witness through cross-examination) (citing Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58,
59 (1821)) (holding that prior opportunity to cross-examine and proof of death allows a deceased
witness's testimony to be admitted as evidence); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. 607, 608-10 (S.C. 1835)
(holding that a police administered deposition is not admissible if witness dies after deposition);
Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 437 (1837) (noting that the exact words of a deceased
witness's previous testimony must be used); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344, 345-46 (1842) (holding
that opting not to cross-examine a witness but later introducing the deposition as evidence allows
witness's deposition to be entered as rebutting testimony); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 485-88
(1850) (holding that the defendant's prior opportunity to confront and cross-examine deceased
witness allows evidence to be admitted); United States v. Macomb, 26 E Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.
11. 1851) (No. 15,702) (holding that testimony of a deceased witness allowed because defendant
cross-examined the witness at initial hearing); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 435-36 (1858) (holding
that absent defendant's wrongdoing prior depositions cannot be entered into evidence).
55 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Laird Kirpatrick, Crawford: A Look Backward,
A Look Forward,20 CaiM. JUST. 6, 7 (2005).

The Court stated that "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in
their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 243. To grant the defendant's claim "would be carrying his constitutional
protection to an unwarrantable extent" and "the rights of the public shall not
be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to
the accused."
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; Kirkpatrick, 20 CRiM. JUST. at 7.
56
Mattox, 156 U. S. at 240 (in the first trial the defendant was convicted but on appeal the case
was reversed and remanded for a new trial).
SId. at 242-44.
5 Id. at 244.
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mine the witness's credibility. 59 Since Mattox, the Court has required a showing
that the witness is unavailable to testify before entering a previous statement into
60
evidence.
In 1965, following a period without Confrontation Clause disputes, the
U.S. Supreme Court heard two Confrontation Clause cases in which it enforced
the accused's fundamental right to have the opportunity to cross-examine a witness. 61 In Pointer v. Texas, the Court held the defendant's confrontation right was
violated because he was not allowed to cross-examine the witness. 62 The Court
held the right to a fair trial, through confrontation and cross-examination, was a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution and was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 In the second case, Douglas v. Alabama,
the Court held that Douglas' confrontation right was violated since the prosecutor read a statement from a person Douglas had no opportunity to cross-examine,
and the jury could infer that since the witness would not testify, the statement was
4
true.6

In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the cases of Bruton v. UnitedStates and
Barberv. Page.65 In Bruton, the Court ruled that Bruton's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated since Bruton was not allowed to cross-examine the co-defendant in
a joint trial. 66 The Court reasoned the jurors could not follow a jury instruction
to disregard the co-defendant's incriminating statement, and the instruction alone
was not enough to satisfy Bruton's confrontation right. 67 The Court compared
the Sixth Amendment and the traditional hearsay rules. 68 The Confrontation
59Id.
"0Kirpatrick, supra note 55, at 7.
61 Pointer

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

62 Pointer,380 U.S. at 401, 403, 405. The case involved a robbery victim who testified at a

preliminary hearing in which the defendant was not represented by counsel. Id. at 401. The defendant made no attempt to cross-examine the witness. Id. At trial, the court allowed the transcript to
be read rather than requiring the witness to testify. Id.
63 Pointer,380 U.S. at 403; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 70-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (majority chose to selectively incorporate the "Bill of
Rights" instead of Justice Black's total incorporation approach.).
' Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416-19. The prosecutor read a police statement previously given by
the accomplice because the accomplice had exercised his Fifth Amendment right to avoid selfincrimination during his testimony. Id. at 416.
65 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
66

Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137. The co-defendant did not testify in a joint trial but the prosecution

read a statement that implicated both Bruton and his co-defendant. Id.
67

61

/d.

Id. at 129.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 2, Art. 9

612

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

Clause and hearsay rules "stem from the same roots," but the two are not the
same.6 9 Evidence may meet the rules of hearsay but not meet the Confrontation
Clause.7"
In Barber, the Court held that since the defendant did not have an opportunity to confront the witness through cross-examination -in front of the jury, the
defendant's confrontation right was violated. 7' This case made the requirement
of the unavailability of a witness more stringent. 72 If a witness is in jail, he is
not unavailable, and the prosecution must make a good-faith effort to produce
the witness at trial. 73 If a witness is available for trial, a defendant has a right to
confront the witness through cross-examination, which allows the jury to determine the witness's credibility.74 Also, the right to cross-examine a witness is not
waived just because the defendant's counsel does not cross-examine the witness at
75
a preliminary hearing.
The Court further explored the differences between availability of testimony
and the importance of the testimony in the 1970 case of Californiav. Green.76 The
Court faced a situation where the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
a witness, but the witness was evasive and kept changing his story.77 The Court
69Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
70Id.

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720-22, 725-26 (1968). A key witness was incarcerated less
than three hundred miles away from the trial, and the State made no effort to have the witness
testify. Id. at 720. Instead the court admitted evidence from a preliminary hearing in which the
defense counsel chose not to cross-examine the witness. Id.
7'

The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of
the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the
more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the
accused for trial.
Id. at 725.
72 Id at 723-25.
73Id.
7' Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968).

Id. at 725.
76California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
71

1 Green, 399 U.S. at 151-52. This case involved a minor, named Porter, who was caught selling
marijuana. Id. at 151. After being arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover police officer,
Porter reported that Green had contacted him and asks him if he wanted to sell some "stuff" which
Green personally delivered to Porter. Id.A week later at the preliminary hearing, Porter stated that
Green was the supplier but he had not personally delivered the marijuana to Porter. Id. At trial two
months later, Porter was uncertain how he had obtained the marijuana because he was on LSD.
Id. at 152. When the prosecutor examined Porter at trial, he read Porter's preliminary hearing
statements. Id. Porter evasively answered the prosecutor's questions, as well as the defendant's crossexamination, by claiming that although the preliminary hearing statements refreshed his memory,
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found the defendant's right to confront the witness had been met. 78 It explained
that, while "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap
is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically
at common law."'79 Even though the reading of the minor witness's previous statements may have been questionable under the hearsay rules, it did not mean the
Confrontation Clause had been violated.8" If a witness was available but could not
remember what happened, no Confrontation Clause violation exists, even if there
had been a hearsay violation.81
Also in 1970, the Court heard Dutton v. Evans where the Court held the
defendant's confrontation right was not violated since he had the opportunity to
cross-examine each witness.82 The Court also found the statement had an "indicia
of reliability" because the statement was made spontaneously and against the coconspirator's own interests.83 The confrontation right does not bar all hearsay
evidence at trial.84 The Confrontation Clause was added to ensure the accused
has the right to show the jury that the witness's statement is not true through
confrontation.85
Next, the Court decided Mancusi v. Stubbs in which a witness had testified
86
and been cross-examined at the first trial and then left the country permanently.
The Court combined requirements from previous cases by holding that the
testimony from the first trial could be used in the second trial upon a showing
of the witness's unavailability, the testimony's reliability, and an opportunity for
the defendant to cross-examine.8 7 The Court admitted the previous testimony
because the jury still had the opportunity to assess the statement's credibility.88

he still was not sure of the details of what had happened since he was taking drugs at the time of
the incident. Id.
7 Green, 399 U.S. at 155.
79

Id.

" Id.
at 156.
1 Id. at 158. This case shows how the Court viewed hearsay and confrontation rights as two
separate doctrines. Id. at 155-56.
82Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 78 (1970). While in prison, Evans's co-conspirator, Williams,

commented to a fellow inmate that Williams would not be in prison if it were not for Evans. Id.
at
77. The fellow inmate testified at Evans' trial and was cross-examined by Evans' counsel. Id.
" Id.at 88-89. The Court started using the "indicia of reliability" to show trustworthiness of
a statement. Id.

Id.at 80.
8 Id.
at 89.
6Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1972).
14

87 Id.at 213,

216.

" Id.
at 216.
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In 1975, Congress implemented the Federal Rules of Evidence which codified
traditional hearsay rules and exceptions.89 In doing so, Congress wanted to ensure
evidence was used in a way to ascertain the truth. 90 However, even if a statement
satisfied the Federal Rules of Evidence, the testimony was still not admissible
unless the Confrontation Clause requirements were met. 9 At this point, the
Confrontation Clause required that the witness be unavailable and the defendant
92
had an opportunity to cross-examine.
The Roberts Era
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Ohio v.
93
Roberts, which changed previously-held notions about the Sixth Amendment.
The Court held, as it had in the past, that entering preliminary hearing testimony
at trial did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights
witness at the prelimisince the defendant's counsel was allowed to question the
94
trial.
for
unavailable
was
witness
the
nary hearing, and
The Court found the Confrontation Clause restricts admissible hearsay in
two ways.99 The first requirement to allow hearsay was called the "rule of necessity," established in Mancusi and Barber.96 That is, if the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, then the prosecution must show that
97
the witness is unavailable in order to admit the prior testimony as evidence.
The second requirement, a major change, came when the Court held that once
a witness is shown to be unavailable, the prosecutor must prove the statement is
trustworthy or reliable, which will allow the fact-finder to determine the state-

89See FED. R. EVID. 102; FED. R. EVID. 801-807. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." Id. at 801(c). H.R. rep. no. 94-355, at 1095 (1975) (This bill "[w]ill put
It will simply provide that
into the Federal Rules of Evidence the prevailing Federal practice ....
out-of-court identifications are admissible if they meet constitutional requirements.").
90FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
91 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970).
92Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 208-13 (1972).

91Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). Roberts involved a witness in a forgery case
who had become unavailable after testifying and being cross-examined at a preliminary hearing.
Id. at 58-59. The witness, Anita, was the victim's daughter. Id. at 58. Despite the prosecution's five
subpoenas, the state was unable to locate Anita for trial. Id. at 59.
94

Id. at 70, 75.

95Id. at 65.
96 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722
(1968).

91Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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ment's credibility.98 The prosecutor can prove reliability by showing the evidence
falls into "certain hearsay exceptions [that] rest upon such solid foundations that
admission of virtually any evidence within them comports the 'substance of the
constitutional protection.' 99 The Court agreed with Dutton and Green that both
the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules protect the same rights.' 00 Since some
hearsay rules are so firmly established, meeting the hearsay rule also means the
constitutional confrontation standard is met.'0 '
After Roberts, the Court's decisions continued to weaken the test of unavailability and reliability. 10 2 For example, in United States v. Inadi, the Court held
that co-conspirators' recorded statements provided a weaker form of evidence
than live testimony.'013 Still, the tape-recorded phone calls could be admitted into
evidence.'0 4 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not require proof
that the co-conspirator was unavailable for trial as long as the statements met
the requirements under the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay. 10 5 In
effect, this case demonstrated the Court's direction that in order for evidence to
be admitted, it only needed to meet the hearsay requirements and not additional
10 6
Confrontation Clause requirements.
Similarly in Bourjailyv. UnitedStates, the trial court admitted a co-conspirator's
taped telephone statements. 0 7 Since the requirements under the Confrontation
Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence were identical, the Court held that if the
statements met the Federal Rules' requirements, there was no need to determine
the reliability requirement under the Confrontation Clause.'0 8

98 Id. at 65-66.

" Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
"'0Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
101Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244) ("[Clertain hearsay exceptions
rest on such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with
the 'substance of constitutional protection."'). The dissent pointed out that although the statement
may have been shown to be reliable, the state must first meet the "threshold requirement" of the
witness's unavailability. Id. at 78-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The state is required to show that it is
impossible for the witness to testify at trial which the dissenters did not agree was met. Id. at 79-80
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
102Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterersAfter Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 757 (2005).
103

Id; United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986).

104

Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390, 400.

105 Id.
at 394-95 (holding the statement must be made in the course and furtherance of the
conspiracy as required by the hearsay rule); FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(E).
106 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-95.

107Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 174 (1987).
08

Id. at 181-82.
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During the Roberts era, the Court only disallowed two types of testimony
as not within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.' 0 9 The first type of testimony
came from accomplices' confessions.I" The Court found these statements unreliable because they were often made to implicate the other person while trying to
save the declarant."' The second type of testimony came in child abuse cases." 2
Although prosecutors used different methods to try to allow the defendant the
right to confront the witness while still trying to protect the young victim, the
Court found that some methods violated the Confrontation Clause." 3 In Coy v.
Iowa, for example, the Court held the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were
violated because a screen placed between the witness and the defendant prevented
him from confronting the witness face-to-face." 4 In Maryland v. Craig,the Court
departed from previous rulings by holding that although face-to-face confrontation is preferred, it is not an absolute Sixth Amendment right. 15 Due to the
trauma caused to the child witness, the Court held that it was permissible under
the Sixth Amendment to allow the child to testify by one-way, closed-circuit
television upon the showing by the state of the trauma that would be caused to
the witness by interaction with the defendant." 6 Then in Idaho v. Wright, the
Court found the statements made by the two-year-old to a doctor did not have
sufficient indicia of reliability and therefore the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront the witness was violated. 117 Wright helped solidify the "indicia of
reliability" requirement and also demonstrated that the Sixth Amendment is only
violated if a hearsay exception is not met." 8
09

See Lininger, supra note 102, at 758.

110 Id.

...Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1999). Three men committed several robberies,
then carjacked a car and killed the driver. Id. at 120. One man told the police that he had been
involved in the robberies but one of the other men had carjacked the car and killed the driver. Id.
at 120-22. The trial court allowed the statement but the U.S. Supreme Court held the statements
were not reliable. Id at 121-22, 130-3 1.
H2 See Lininger, supra note 102, at 758.
113 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840-42,
855, 860 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826-27 (1990).
114Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-18 (1988). The Court reasoned that the defendant has a

right of face-to-face confrontation in addition to the right to cross-examine. Id. at 1020-22.
H5 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857-58 (1990). The Court remanded the case and
held if there was no showing of possible trauma to the victim, it would violate the defendant's
Confrontation rights to allow the witness to testify by closed-circuit television. Id. at 860.
116Id. at 840-42.
W7Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822, 827 (1990). Two sisters, one 5 and one 2 , told their
father's girlfriend that their mother's boyfriend had sexually assaulted them with the help of their
mother. Id. at 808-09. After being reported to police, the girls were examined and interviewed by a
doctor, but he did not properly record the interview. Id. at 809-11. At trial, the judge determined
that the then three-year-old could not testif, so the doctor testified about the substance of the
interview. Id. at 809, 816, 818. Both the mother and the boyfriend were convicted of two counts of
lewd conduct with a minor. Id. at 812.
"' See Lininger, supra note 102, at 758.
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The Crawford Era
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court reinvented the Confrontation Clause when
it decided Crawford v. Washington."9 Crawford overruled the guidelines set forth
in Ohio v. Roberts concerning testimonial statements. 120 The Court in Crawford
found the Confrontation Clause required an opportunity to cross-examine,
regardless of the showing of the statement's reliability. 2 ' The Crawford ruling

"9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). In Crawford,

Kenneth Lee allegedly

attempted to rape Sylvia Crawford, so her husband, Michael Crawford, went to Lee's house to
confront him. Id. at 38. Michael ended up stabbing Lee, and the police eventually arrested Michael
for attempted murder. Id. While in police custody, the police read both Michael and Sylvia their
Miranda warnings and then interrogated the couple separately. Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966). Michael and Sylvia's statements were generally consistent, although Sylvia contradicted Michael by saying that Lee did not reach for a weapon. Crawford,541 U.S. at 38-40. As
evidence at Michael's trial, the prosecutor entered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement to the police
under the State's "hearsay exception against penal interest." Id. at 40; WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)
(identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)). Washington State marital privilege law barred
Sylvia from testifying, though it allowed a spouse's out-of-court statement to be admitted under a
hearsay exception. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40; State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 760 (1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994) ("A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife, without
the consent of the wife, nor a wife for or against her husband without the consent of the husband;
nor can either during marriage or afterward, be without the consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the other during marriage."). Michael refused to waive the privilege
to allow his wife to testify and counsel to cross-examine her. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. The trial
court admitted the statement into evidence despite Michael's Confrontation Clause objections, and
the jury convicted Michael of assault. Id. at 40-4 1. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction because, in applying a "nine-factor test," it felt Sylvia's statement was not reliable since it
contradicted a prior verbal statement, the statement resulted from specific police questioning, and
"she admitted she had shut her eyes during the stabbing." Id. at 41; State v. Crawford, 54 P3d 656,
661 n.3 (2002); State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 425 (1993). The nine factors were:
(1) whether the declarant, at the time of making the statement, had an
apparent motive to lie; (2) whether the declarant's general character suggests
trustworthiness; (3) whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) the spontaneity of the statement; (5) whether trustworthiness is suggested
from the timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant
and the witness; (6) whether the statement contains express assertions of past
fact; (7) whether the declarant's lack of knowledge could be established by
cross-examination; (8) the remoteness of the possibility that the declarant's
recollection is faulty; and (9) whether the surrounding circumstances suggest
that the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement.
State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 661 n.3. The Washington Supreme Court reversed even though
it found the statement did not fall under the hearsay exception. Washington v. Crawford, 54 P.
3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002). Unlike the court of appeals, the Washington Supreme Court held
Sylvia's statement was, in fact, reliable. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and
reversed the Washington Supreme Court's decision. Crawford v. Washington, 540 U.S. 964 (2003);
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
12o Id. at 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers'
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts .... ").
121Id. at 68-69. Before Crawford, if a statement qualified under the hearsay exception, it met
the confrontation requirement. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813-14 (1990).
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required separate confrontation and hearsay analyses.' 22 Evidence that previously
123
would have been admitted without concern was now inadmissible.
The Court held that playing the recorded statement at trial violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the witness against him
because the statement was testimonial, and the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.1 24 In order to meet Confrontation Clause
requirements, the statement must be testimonial, the witness must be unavailable, and the defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 125
In the opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court explained that the history of the Sixth Amendment supported its ruling. 126 The Confrontation Clause
was written to prevent the use of "ex parte examinations of evidence against the
accused.''1 27 The Court found the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant against
witnesses who "bear testimony."1 28 Although the Court did not specifically define
the term "testimonial," it did give examples, stating that "[a] ffidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions" are testimonial. 129 The Court also found that
"[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also
testimonial, under even a narrow standard."' 30
Crawford illustrated some key changes in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.13 'The Court held that hearsay and confrontation rights are two distinct
issues. 3 2 Also, by holding that only testimonial statements invoke confrontation
33
issues, it created separate rules for testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
For a testimonial statement to be admitted, the witness must be unavailable and
34
the defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
122

Lininger, supra note 102, at 765.

Id. at 768.

113

124
Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.

Id. at 53-54.

125
126

Id. at 50.

127

Id.

128 Id. at

51. The Court used an 1828 edition of Webster's An American Dictionaryofthe English

Language in defining testimony as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact." Id.
129 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J.,concurring)).
130Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
131 Id.at

53.

132Id. at

53; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that some hearsay rules were so

established that meeting the hearsay requirement also meets the confrontation requirement).
133Crawford, 541 U.S at 59, 68.
134
Id. at 59.
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For a non-testimonial statement, states are allowed some flexibility, as shown in
Roberts.' 15 The key in many cases could be in the definition of the statement as
testimonial or non-testimonial. 136 Although the Court gave a few examples of
what could be a testimonial statement, it became clear that more clarification was
37
needed.
After Crawford, Wyoming courts responded much like other state courts.'38
The Wyoming case against Michael Sarr demonstrates the different approaches
used before and after Crawford.13 The State charged Sarr with seven counts of
aggravated assault and battery in February of 2001 for alleged attacks against
Ann Wing. 4 ° The charges were supported in part by Wing's two tape-recorded
statements to police and the police search of the home for evidence.' Wing
died shortly after making the statements.' 42 After being convicted of five counts
of assault and battery, Sarr appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court, which
decided the case in March of 2003.13 The court found the State secured the
convictions based solely on Wing's police interviews.' The evidence conformed
with the Wyoming Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), but this rule was not a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception.' In considering the totality of the circumstances, the
Wyoming Supreme Court decided that the statement was trustworthy, therefore,
the trial court properly admitted the statement. 146 Sarr appealed to the U.S.

'35 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that
requirements of unavailability and "indicia of reliability" must be shown for a statement to be admitted as evidence).
136 Richard D. Friedman, Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, 20 CraM. JUST. 36, 36-37

(2005).
Id. at 36; see Crawford,541 U.S. at 51.
131See Sarr v. Wyoming, 113 P.3d 1051 (Wyo. 2005) [hereinafter Sarr HI]; Vigil v. Wyoming,
98 P.3d 172 (Wyo. 2004) (reversing conviction when co-conspirator's previous statement to police
admitted into evidence without any opportunity for defendant to cross-examine); Wyoming v. Sarr,
65 P3d 711 (Wyo. 2003) [hereinafter Sarr I]; Jeanine Percival, The Priceof Silence. The Prosecution
of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 216-18
(2005).
139 Sarr H, 113 P3d at 1051.
137

140Sarr 1,

65 P.3d at 714-15.

141Id. at 714. Sarr and Wing's intimate relationship allegedly included abusive acts such as

making her stand in the corner, hitting her with a "coup stick," throwing things at her, throwing
her to the ground, striking her with a vehicle, repeatedly bashing her head against the dining room
table, striking her with a pistol belt full of shells, threatening to kill her with a firearm, and kicking
her in the head while wearing heavy winter boots. Id. at 714-15.
142Id. at 715 (noting that Wing drowned in the bathtub and the death was unrelated to the
charges against Sarr).
143Id. at 713, 715.
144Id. at 715.
SarrI,65 P3d at 715-17; Wyo. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
146Id. at 716, 718. The Wyoming Supreme Court did find one count lacked sufficient evidence
'45

of injury. Id. at 719.
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Supreme Court, which remanded the case to be considered in light of Crawford.14 7
In June 2005, the Wyoming Supreme Court reconsidered the same facts and
reversed two of the convictions it had previously upheld.'48 The court found that
Wing's statements were testimonial and Sarr had not been given the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness as Crawfordrequired. 49
PRINCIPAL CASE

While Crawford held the confrontation requirement applied to testimonial
1 50
statements, Davis addressed the testimonial nature of police interrogation.
Crawford stated police interrogations were subject to the Confrontation Clause
because the statements given to police would be testimonial."'5 The issue presented
to the Court allowed it to determine when a statement made to law enforcement
personnel would be testimonial and thus "subject to the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause."' 52 The Court refined this by differentiating
53
between testimonial and non-testimonial statements in police interrogations.1
Davis clarified the testimonial nature of the two most common types of
police interrogations: 911 calls and questioning at the scene of a crime. 154 The
first case involved a 911 call made to police by Michelle McCottry.' 55 The second
case involved a police interrogation at the scene of a domestic dispute located in
156
Hershel and Amy Hammon's home.
The Court began by reiterating that the Confrontation Clause gives a person
a right to confront the witness against him. 57 The basis of the confrontation
right depends on the declarant being a witness.' 58 Only a person who makes a
59
testimonial statement is a witness.
Wyoming v. Sarr, 125 S. Ct. 297 (2004).
Sarr I, 113 P3dat 1052.
149 Id. at 1053. The court was not asked to determine the testimonial nature of the statement.
141

148

Id. at 1053.
150Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006).
151 Crawford,541 U.S. at 52.
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2270.

152

at 2273-74.
v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005); Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446
(Ind. 2005).
155 Davis, 111 P3d at 846; Seesupra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
156 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005); See supra notes 18-36 and accompa153Id.

154State

nying text.
157Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
158Id.
Id.

159
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The Court held that if a statement is made in an attempt to receive help from
the police in an emergency, it is non-testimonial.16 ° It stated that a non-testimonial
statement is one "made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."16' Therefore, the declarant in
an emergency encounter with police is not considered a witness within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 61 2 The Court unanimously
found that McCottry's statement identifying Davis as her attacker was asking for
help in an "ongoing emergency," because she described the "events as they were
actually happening, rather than 'describ[ing] past events."'163
A statement is testimonial "when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."' 164 Since the Confrontation Clause applies only to declarants who
bear testimony, the testimonial nature of the statement causes the declarant to
become a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 165
The Court was focusing on police interrogations and began by categorizing
police interrogations to include interrogations that take place at the scene of an
incident as well as 911 calls.' 66 In Crawford, the Court found that police interrogations were testimonial. 167 But in Davis, the Court differentiated the testimonial
nature of statements that resulted in different types of situations where police
interrogations occur. 168 The initial interrogation during a 911 call is generally to
69
determine what the situation is and what type of police assistance will be needed. 1
The purpose of the 911 operator's interrogation is not to determine past events,
70
therefore, it will generally be non-testimonial. 1
The Court also found an interrogation may begin as non-testimonial and
progress into a testimonial statement once the emergency has ended.' 7' The
161Id. at 2273, 2277.
161Id. at 2273.
162 Davis, 126

S. Ct. at 2273.

163 Id.
ICAId.

at 2273-74 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)).
2273.

165 Id. at

'66Id. at 2274 n.2.
167Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
'68Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
169Id.

at 2276, 2279.

170Id. at 2279.
171Id. at 2277. The Court explained:

This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation to
determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme
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Court applied this standard by comparing McCottry and Sylvia Crawford's interrogations.' 72 Sylvia's interrogation happened in the police station where she gave
answers that were recorded by an attending police officer. 1 73 In contrast, the 911
174
operator interrogated McCottry while she remained in the place of the attack.
She frantically answered questions in a place where she was unsafe, unprotected,
and in immediate danger. 175 She described the events as they were occurring
instead of having occurred in the past. 76 The Court found she was not testifying
as a witness would under direct examination. 77 Instead, McCottry was seeking
aid from police. 78 So admitting her statement did not violate Davis's confronta79
tion rights.
In reversing and remanding Hershel's conviction by an eight-to-one vote,
the Court reasoned that Amy's affidavit was testimonial, and a prior opportunity
to cross-examine must be afforded Hershel in order to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause requirements. 8 ' The testimonial nature of Amy's statement derived from
the fact she was describing past events as opposed to an ongoing emergency. 8 '
The Court, as it did in Davis, compared the interrogations of Amy Hammon
and Sylvia Crawford and found the interrogations to be similar. 8 2 The primary
purpose of both interrogations was to prove past conduct.'83 Both interrogations
took place after the event or emergency had ended, while they were separated
from their husbands, and in the presence of police.' 84 The Court did acknowledge

Court put it, "evolve into testimonial statements," once that purpose has been
achieved. In this case, for example, after the operator gained the information
needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told
McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could
readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry's statements were
testimonial, not unlike the "structured police questioning" that occurred in
Crawford.

Id.
172Id. at 2276-77.
17'Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006).
174Id. at 2276.
175Id.

176 d.
177Id.

178Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77 (2006).
179Id. at 2277-78.
180Id. at 2278.
181Id.
182

Id.

H3 Davis, 126

S. Ct. at 2278.

184Id.
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the difference in formality between the two situations.185 Sylvia's interrogation
took place in the police station after she had been read her Miranda rights, but
Amy's interrogation took place in her living room with no Miranda warning.'86
The Court found the level of formality may strengthen the testimonial claim
18 7
regarding a statement, but the formality is not required.
While concurring with the majority in upholding the Davis conviction, Justice
Thomas dissented with respect to the reversal of the conviction in the Hammon
case.' 88 He agreed with the majority that the history of the Confrontation Clause
supports the definition of a witness and that only a witness can bear testimony. 89
To be considered as a witness, however, a level of formality should be required. 90
In Crawford, the police read the Miranda warnings and then took Sylvia's statements while she was in police custody.' That level of formality alerted the witness
92
to the importance of her statements.
Justice Thomas also claimed the articulated primary purpose test "yields no
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with
the law."' 93 The primary purpose of law enforcement is not always singular or
clear. 194 A law enforcement officer generally has the purposes of responding to
the emergency and gathering evidence.' 9 Rather than the police in the field, the
196
courts will be charged with determining the officer's actual purpose.
Thus, Justice Thomas advocated that neither the 911 call in Davis nor the
affidavit in Hammon would be testimonial under the correct approach.197 Thomas
reasoned that the lack of formality and the inconsistency with the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause furthered the conclusion that did not apply to either interrogation.1 98 He argued that the new standards are "neither workable nor a targeted
attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the Clause."' 99 The standard is overId.

185
186

Id. at 2278; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).

187Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
188Id. at 2285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189Id.

at 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

190Id. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

'9' Id. at 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
192Davis,
193Id.

126 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

'9' Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195Id. (Thomas,
196Id.

J., dissenting).
at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

'97Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198Id.

at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

199 Id. at

2285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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inclusive since the Confrontation Clause was never meant to cover informal police
interrogations whether it occurred on the phone or at the scene. 2°0 Furthermore,
he argued that the majority's apprehension that the right will be evaded if it only
applies to formal statements can be remedied by the court controlling the use of
evidence that is entered by the prosecution as a way of "circumventing the literal

right of confrontation. "201
The Court rejected the "formality test" proposed by Justice Thomas although
he argued it might clarify when testimony is actually taken.0 2 Justice Thomas
argued the history of the Confrontation Clause and the past cases do not support
the majority's ruling. 203 The "formality test" would require a formalized statement 'Es] uch as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" in order
to qualify for protection under the Confrontation Clause. 20 4 Statements to police
that are not formalized with Mirandawarnings or in a formal setting would not
qualify.2 5 Since the statements were not formalized by Mirandawarnings in either
case, the statements would not qualify as testimony or invoke the Confrontation
Clause. They simply lack the formal nature required for testimony that lets wit26
nesses know they are giving testimony.
ANALYSIS

In Davis, the Court considered two different tests for determining whether
a statement made by a declarant during police interrogations was testimonial or
non-testimonial: The "primary purpose test," accepted by the majority, and the
"formality test," proposed by Justice Thomas in his dissent. 20 7 Both tests have
strengths and weaknesses and will shape domestic violence cases in different ways.
Due to the many domestic violence cases, prosecutors, attorneys, and courts need
an effective way to handle these cases. Confrontation becomes an important issue
in domestic violence cases. If a victim's statement to police requires the victim to
later testify, many domestic violence offenses will be difficult to prosecute if the
victim refuses to cooperate.

21

Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

21

Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

202Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2282-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203

d. at 2281 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

204Id. at 2282 (Thomas, J. dissenting); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992).
205Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J. dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

479 (1966).
206 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at

2273-74; see also id. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Comparingthe PrimaryPurpose Test with the Formality Test
The majority of the Court adopted the "primary purpose test" to determine if
statements made during police interrogations should be considered testimonial or
non-testimonial. 0 8 This objective test requires a court to determine whether the
police interrogator's primary purpose was made to collect evidence of a past criminal act to be used later for prosecution or to aid in an emergency. °9 To determine
if a statement is testimonial, a court may consider facts indicating formality in the
gathering of the statement, the surrounding circumstances of safety or emergency,
and the method of recording the statement.21 0
A strength the "primary purpose test" affords is a definition of what is and is
not testimonial. 11' Although Crawfordpreviously differentiated between testimonial and non-testimonial statements, it articulated only a broad guideline. 12 The
"primary purpose test" provides a more detailed analysis to be applied and allows
for an objective determination by the court of the circumstances surrounding the
statement. 213 The Court's use of objective tests is favorable because it avoids the
2 14
problem of courts having to try to figure out individuals' thoughts.
The disadvantage of the "primary purpose test" is that it may lead to further
uncertainty in its effective resolution of the confrontation issues. 215 The Davis
Court adopted a standard defining "testimonial" that may lead to unpredictability.21 6 For example, unpredictability may arise in defining when the emergency

208

Id. at 2273-74; Michael H. Graham, The Davis Narrowing of Crawford: Is the Primary

Purpose Test of Davis Jurisprudentially "Sound," "Workable," and "Predictable?",42 No. 5 CRiM. L.
BULL. 4 (2006).
209Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 2277.
211

See id.at 2276-77.

211

Id. at 2273-74.

212

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 68 (2004).

213Davis, 126 S. Ct.at 2273-74; Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The ConfrontationClause
After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 11, 12
(2006), at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol105/fine.pdf (last visited March
1,2007).
214 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996). A plainclothes police officer
arrested the defendant after stopping the vehicle for a minor traffic violation and then discovering
drugs in the car. Id. at 808-09. The issue in the case hinged on whether the police officer's subjective
thoughts should be considered. Id. at 808. The Court found that the lower court was correct in
looking at what a reasonable officer in the situation would have done. Id. at 813, 819.
215 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216 Lisa Kern Griffin, CirclingAroundthe ConfrontationClause:Redefined Reach But Nota Robust

Right, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 18 (2006) at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
firstimpressions/vol 105/giffin.pdf (last visited March 1, 2007); Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2283 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The CrawfordCourt criticized Roberts for creating precisely the same unpredictability.
Lininger, supra note 102, at 763-64; Griffin, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS at 18.
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21 7
has ended, given that a statement's timing might affect its primary purpose.
An interrogation that starts as a non-testimonial request for assistance can "evolve
into [a] testimonial statement" once the emergency assistance is rendered or
the emergency has ended. 218 The fine line can mean the difference between key
evidence being admitted or not. 219 For example, when McCottry told the 911
operator Davis had left the house, the statement changed from non-testimonial
220
to testimonial because the emergency had ended.

Although McCottry's case seemed obvious, difficulty may arise in deciding
when the emergency ended in other situations since part of the interrogation
could be testimonial and part could be non-testimonial. 221 If the emergency ends
when an alleged abuser leaves the scene, the point when the caller informs the 9 11
operator that the alleged abuser has left the scene may affect the testimonial nature
of the statement. 222 In Hammon, the immediate emergency was over when the
police arrived, but an argument could be made as to when the emergency really
ends in domestic dispute situations. 223 A judge could make a determination about
the level of violence and the possibility that, although the initial incident may
have ended, there is still an emergency. 224 Leaving such decisions to an individual
225
judge may lead to inconsistencies in applying the standard.
Another source of uncertainty may arise since the new test requires courts to
objectively determine, 22from the circumstances, law enforcement's primary motive
for the interrogation.
Although the test appears to be logical, it is a legal ic222

tion. 2 27 An officer usually has many motives including ensuring the safety of the
caller, protecting the officer's own safety, gathering evidence, and determining if

217 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218 Id.

at 2277 (citing Hammon, 829 N.E. 2d at 457).

219 See

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.

220 Davis,
221

126 S. Ct. at 2277.

Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, and The Supreme Court: The Casefor

Cautious Optimism, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 26 (2006), at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voIl05/meier.pdf (last visited March 1, 2007); Fine, supra note 213,
at 12.
222 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. Because the objective view of the police interrogator is what
is important, if the reasonable 911 operator believes there is an emergency then the statement
would be non-testimonial. Id; Geetanjli Malhorta, Note, Resolving the Ambiguity behind the BrightLine Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the Admissibility of911 Calls in Evidence-Based
Domestic Violence Prosecutions,2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 205, 214 (2006).
223 Meier, supra note 221, at 26.
224

Id.

225

Id.

226

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74; Fine, supra note 213, at 12.

227 Fine,

supra note 213, at 12-13; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Meier,

supra note 221, at 25.
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criminal activity has occurred. 228 Since the police officer may have more than one
purpose, the primary one may be difficult to determine, leading to unpredictable
rulings by the courts. 22 9 This unpredictability could cause difficulty for prosecutors in determining charges to bring, and for law enforcement officers in knowing
230
how to respond and record the events through statements.
Further uncertainty may arise from the requirement that the courts consider
the police officer's motivations without considering the speaker's motivation or
reasonable expectations.231 Consideration of the police officer's motivation will lead
to different results than consideration of the speaker's motivation.23 2 A speaker in
a domestic violence situation may have the primary purpose of obtaining protection with little thought given to future prosecution. 23 3 But prosecution may be the
police officer's primary motivation. 234 If the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
is to prevent governmental abuses, as the majority found, the intent of the person
235
giving the statement should be considered instead of the police officer's intent.
In a footnote to the majority opinion, the Court recognized that the intent of the
person giving the statement should be considered: it is the "[d]eclarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us
to evaluate." 23 6 But the "primary purpose test" does not consider the declarant's
intent in making the statement. 237 This inconsistency caused confusion in a ruling
by the West Virginia Supreme Court shortly after Davis. 238 The court held that it
should "focus more upon the witness' statement, and less upon any interrogator's
239
questions."

228

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Fine, supra note 213, at 12-13; Meier,

supranote 221, at 25.
229 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Griffin, supra note 216, at 18.
230 Davis,
23'

126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Fine, supra note 213, at 12.

232 Id; see also Meier, supra note 221, at 25.
233

Meier, supra note 221, at 25.

234

Id.

235

Griffin, supra note 216, at 21 ("The goal of confrontation, according to Crawfordsreasoning

and Davis's purposive test, is to expose any governmental coercion or manipulation.") The Court
did "clarify that the confrontation clause focuses solely upon conduct by governmental officials."
Graham, supra note 208.
236 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274, n. 1.
237

Fine, supra note 213, at 12; Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward,or a Step

Back?, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2006), at http://www.michiganlawreview.
org/firstimpressions/vol105/lininger.pdf (last visited March 1, 2007).
238State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321-22 (W Va. 2006).
239

Id. at 321-22.
We believe that the Court's holdings in Crawford and in Davis regarding the
meaning of "testimonial statements" may therefore be distilled down into the
following three points. First, a testimonial statement is, generally, a statement
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As a practical matter, Davis might encourage police manipulation by officers
cautiously reporting the situation. 2 0 The emergency requirement might also lead
to officers questioning the victim while the emergency is ongoing and before they
ensure the victim is safe.241
The "primary purpose test" is a compromise between the right of the defendant to confront the witness, even regarding informal statements, and the ability
to admit statements, without confrontation, that are clearly given in the heat of
the emergency. 24 2 Justice Thomas claimed that by allowing informal statements,
the test "shift[s] the ability to control whether a violation occurred from the police
and prosecutor to the judge, whose determination as to the 'primary purpose' of
a particular interrogation would be unpredictable and not necessarily tethered to
243
the actual purpose for which the police performed the interrogation.
The alternative test the Court considered and rejected was the "formality
test." In his dissent, Justice Thomas advocated for a test that would not consider
the primary purpose of the interrogation but would instead consider the level
of formality under which the statement was obtained. 24 Formality in the police
interrogation would alert the declarant to the fact that he or she is giving testimony.245 This test provides a more definite guideline as to when a statement is
testimonial.246 It requires that formality exists, such as the statement is taken in
a formal setting like a police station, and a warning is given that the statement is
24 7
being considered as evidence of a past crime.

that is made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial. Second, a witness's statement taken by a law enforcement officer in the
course of an interrogation is testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of
the witness's statement is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution. A witness's statement taken by a law enforcement
officer in the course of an interrogation is non-testimonial when made under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the statement
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. And third, a court
assessing whether a witness's out-of-court statement is "testimonial" should
focus more upon the witness's statement, and less upon any interrogator's
questions.

Id.
240Fine, supra note 213, at 13.
241 Id.
242

Griffin, supra note 216, at 16-17.

243 Davis,

126 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).

244 Id.
245 Id.
246

Id.

247

Id.
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The major disadvantage of the "formality test" is that the Confrontation
Clause could be circumvented by a police officer simply not formalizing a statement. 248 An informal statement would be considered non-testimonial and would
not require that the defendant have a right to cross-examine the witness. 249 The
majority found that as police procedures for gathering information become more
informal, those informal statements should be covered by the Confrontation
Clause. 250 The majority of the Court found that some formality is required for
making a statement testimonial, but the Court did not describe what levels of
formality would be considered appropriate. 251 Although the "formality test" is a
252
bright-line rule, the Davis Court clearly adopted the "primary purpose test."

Domestic Violence Cases
Domestic violence cases, as illustrated in Davis, present unique issues surrounding the revived Confrontation Clause. 25 3 Domestic violence victims often
request help from law enforcement and initially cooperate with prosecutors only
to later withdraw prior statements and try to get the charges dropped. 25 4 Due to
the private nature in which domestic violence occurs, the new rules may prohibit
many domestic violence cases from being successfully prosecuted without the
victim's statement. 255 The victim's reasons for failing to testify may be persuasion
or threats of retaliation from the abuser.256 Also, the victim could lose financial
support provided by the abuser if the abuser is detained or incarcerated as a result
of a successful prosecution. 257 The victim may also be fearful of children being
taken by the state or hurt by the abuser. 258 Domestic violence centers on a pattern
248 Davis,

126 S. Ct. at 2276. The Court explained that it "do[es] not think it conceivable

that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking
policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant
sign a deposition." Id.
249 Id. at 2282-83 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
250Id. at 2278 n. 5 ("We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as our 18th century
forebears did not, examining police officers ....").
25' Richard D. Friedman, We Really (For the Most Part)Mean It, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST

IMPRESSIONS 1, 4 (2006), at http://www.michiganlawreview.orglfirstimpressionslvollO5/friedman.
pdf (last visited March 1, 2007).
252 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
253 Patrice Wade DiPietro, Domestic Dispute Cases Prompt Closer Look at Confrontation Clause,

8 No. 17 LAw. J. 3, 9 (2006); see David G. Savage, Confronting911 Evidence: High Court Ponders
Whether Statements are "Testimonial,"Requiring Confrontation, 92 A.B.A.J. 12 (2006).
254Raeder, supra note 47, at 24.
255Id.
256 Andrew

King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing-A Panaceafor Victimless Domestic Violence

Prosecutions,39 CREIGHTON L. REv.441, 458-59 (2006).
257 Id. at 458.
258 Id. at 443 n.14.
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of control that is often used to influence the victim.2 59 Unlike other criminal
charges, the abuser has access to the victim, even after the court issues a nocontact order.2 60 The abuser can use this access to control and persuade the victim
261
not to testify.
The dynamics of domestic violence illustrates practical problems prosecutors
will encounter in this post-Crawford era.262 In the past, domestic violence prosecutions often utilized statements of absent victims under the "excited utterances"
exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence and identical state rules. 263 Now, the
Court's new requirements have added an additional burden over the hearsay
requirements of "excited utterances" which will greatly impair domestic violence
prosecutions. 264 Reports from news agencies shortly after Crawfordindicated prosecutors were forced to drop nearly fifty percent of domestic violence prosecutions
since an estimated eighty percent of victims refused to cooperate. 265 Prosecutors
were forced to decide on a case-by-case basis if charges could be successfully
brought on other evidence if the witness did not testify, or how the credibility of
a victim might be damaged if the victim testified to something different than was
first reported.266
The Court's rationale in Crawfordand Davis was a historically based notion
that a defendant had the right to confront adverse witnesses. 267 But there are
259 Id. at

459.

The battering relationship is not about conflict between two people; rather, it
is about one person exercising power and control over the other. Battering is a
pattern of verbal and physical abuse, but the barterer's behavior can take many
forms. Common manifestations of that behavior include imposing economic
or financial restrictions, enforcing physical and emotional isolation, repeatedly
invading the victim's privacy, supervising the victim's behavior, terminating
support from family or friends, threatening violence toward the victim, threatening suicide, getting the victim addicted to drugs or alcohol, and physically
or sexually assaulting the victim. The purpose of the abusive behavior is to
subjugate the victim and establish the batterer's superiority.
Id. (quoting Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 301, 304 (2005)).
260Lininger, supra note 102, at 769-70.
261

Id.

262

Id.

263Raeder, supra note 47, at 24; FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Washington court allowed McCottry's

statement under the Washington Rules of Evidence. WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(2). The Indiana court
allowed Amy's statement under the Indiana Rules of Evidence. IND. R. EvID. 803(2).
264Lininger, supra note 102, at 773-82.
26' Raeder, supra note 47, at 25.
266

Id. at 24-25.

267 Myrna Raeder, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in

Light of Its Past: Remember the Ladies and the Children:Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and
ChildAbuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 311, 311-12 (2005); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
43-45 (2004).
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problems with adopting policies and practices from 1791 without adapting them
to the realities of modern life. 268 The Court retreated to a time when women were
not allowed to participate in creating policy and rules. 26 9 A woman was no longer
considered a separate legal person when she married, but rather an extension of
her husband. 270 Furthermore, women were not considered equal to men. 271 Also,
in 1791, the husband's responsibilities included chastising his wife if he believed
she had misbehaved.272 It is unlikely the founding fathers could have imagined a
world that did not tolerate domestic violence. 273 They were unlikely to imagine a
world where "911 protocols are routine, as are pro- or mandatory-arrest policies,
no-drop prosecutions, criminal contempt convictions for violation of protective
orders, expansive hearsay exceptions and in some states reporting requirements
274
for medical personnel.
There have also been many advances since 1791, including the organization
of police forces, and medical, forensic, and technological advances (videotape,
two-way television, telephone, e-mail, audiotape, typewriters, and computerized
recordings). 275 These advances have helped make evidence easily accessible and
accepted in the courtroom and should be considered in deciding issues related to
276
Confrontation Clause issues.
Although the "primary purpose test" was a step forward in defining what is
testimonial, it raises concern in domestic violence cases.277 The police officers'
motivation in domestic violence situations is often to keep the victim safe, which
278
might not fall neatly into the category of emergency or evidence-building.
Keeping a victim of domestic violence safe might involve intervention and assistance long after the initial incident is over.279 Collecting evidence for prosecution
of the abuser might aid in protecting the victim from further harm. 28 0 Davis affects
police by requiring a police officer to consider the situation in light of what a court

26'

Raeder, supra note 267, at 311.

26 9

Id.at 311-12.

270Virginia H. Murray, Part Three: "Traditional"Legal Perspective:A ComparativeSurvey ofthe
Historic Civil, Common, and American Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKIA.
CTY UL. Rrv. 433, 440 (1998).
271Id. at

435-36.

272

Raeder, supra note 267, at 311-12.

273

Id. at 312.

274

Id.at 312, 326-29.

275Id.at 311-12.
276
See
277

id.
at 313.
Meier, supra note 221, at 23.

27

Id.at 25.

279

Id at 26.

280

Id
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will later consider to be the primary motivation for the police officer's actions. 281
The police officer might ask questions that relate to the victim's safety but could
also be used to assess criminal activity.28 2 The setting, timing, and framing of the
question might change the testimonial nature of the statement given by the alleged
victim. 28 3 The police interrogation in Hammon occurred after the police arrived
at the Hammon home.284 Amy told police officers she was fine.285 One police
officer questioned Amy in a separate room while the other police officer remained
with Hershel in the kitchen to ensure Amy's safety. 28 6 Yet, the Court found this
statement testimonial because it was taken after the emergency had ended.287 This
illustrates that how and when the police officer takes a statement might affect the
testimonial nature and admissibility of the statement, since danger can exist even
after the initial incident is over. 288 If the police had not separated them and still
had to restrain Hershel, a court would have to determine if the emergency had
ended.289
The good news in domestic violence cases is, although the Supreme Court
found the emergency had ended when the police arrived in the Hammon case,
the lower courts have latitude to determine when the emergency has ended. 290 A
court can base its decision on the facts of the particular case. 29' If it finds danger
still existed in a domestic violence case, then the emergency had not ended and
292
any statements made would be non-testimonial.
Although Davis has made it more difficult to prosecute abusers, domestic violence cases cannot be ignored because there are simply too many cases.293 Alternative

281

See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006); Linger, supra note 102, at

778-81.
282

Raeder, supra note 267, at 312-13; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting);

Meier, supra note 221, at 26.
283 Meier, supra note 221, at 26.
284

Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446-47 (Ind. 2005); Meier, supra note 221, at 26.

285

Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.

286Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446; Meier, supra note 221, at 26.
287

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.

288

Meier, supra note 221, at 26

289

Id.

290

Id.

291

Id.

292 Id.

293 Raeder,

supra note 47, at 27. This article supports the volume of cases with the fact that

"nearly 590,000 nonfatal acts of domestic violence were estimated to have been committed against
women in 2001, and approximately 1,250 women were killed by an intimate partner in 2000."
Meier, supra note 221, at 23 ("[Domestic violence] cases now constitute up to half of calls to police
and form 20 to 50% of criminal dockets, and may well constitute a majority of the case where
confrontation rights are at issue.").
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ways of handling domestic violence cases have been advocated.294 Since issues
arise with the right to cross-examine a witness, the first solution requires officers
to question victims in such a way that their statements are non-testimonial and
the person is not a witness.2 95 One strategy might be active interrogations before
the emergency has ended.296 Emergency operators are currently trained to ask as
many questions as possible about the nature of the emergency.297 If this is done
298
before the emergency has ended, then the statements are non-testimonial.
The second solution involves legislative reform. 299 The key issue in domestic
violence cases centers around the right to cross-examine the witness, but Crawford
does not require the cross-examination take place at trial. 30 The more time
that passes from the assault to trial, the more likely the victim will change or
withdraw the accusations.3"' The legislative reforms would require more frequent
opportunities to cross-examine the victim. 30 2 These opportunities might include
non-waivable preliminary hearings, special hearings held very shortly after the
incident, or depositions.3 13 Another strategy is to pass laws that would detain the
0 4
abuser and provide a quicker trial in order to eliminate witness intimidation.

ForfeitureDoctrine
Unlike other cases where the prosecutor has some control over the witness,
in domestic violence cases, the defendant has the control over the victim. 30 5 The
Davis Court acknowledged that domestic violence cases are "notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify
30 6
at trial."
The Court suggested the forfeiture doctrine might be a solution to evidence
being excluded in domestic violence cases. 30 7 In these cases, the defendant often
294

Lininger, supra note 102, at 783-818.

295Id. at 776; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
296

Fine, supra note 213, at 12-13.

297 Lininger, supra note 102, at 776.

298 Id.; Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2273-74.
299Lininger, supra note 102, at 783-84.

300Id. at 784.
301Id. at

786.
302 Id. at 784-86.
303Id. at 787-97.
3' Lininger, supra note 102, at 815-16.

305
Id.
306Griffin, supra note 216, at 19; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).

307Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. Forfeiture means the defendant waives the Sixth Amendment
right if responsible for taking actions that caused the victim's absence or inability to testify. Id. at
2279-80.
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makes the witness unavailable for trial using threats or intimidation. 08 Therefore,
forfeiture could allow a victim's statements to be entered into evidence where they
would not otherwise be admissible. 0 9
Unfortunately, the Court only briefly mentioned forfeiture.310 Worse, it did
not define Confrontation Clause forfeiture other than to say that if the defendant
acts in a way that coerces the victim to silence, confrontational protections will be
waived.3 1 For support, the Court only cited the 1879 case of Reynolds v. United
States.312 In Reynolds, the Court held that the State must prove a witness's testimony
was unavailable because of the defendant's conduct.313 The burden then shifts to
the defendant to show no involvement. 314 If forfeiture is proven, then the witness's
testimony can be admitted into evidence if the evidence is "competent."315 The
Reynolds Court did not, however, define "competent."31 6 The facts indicated
"competent" evidence included prior testimony subject to cross-examination.3 1 7
The Court did not clarify whether it intended modern forfeiture to encompass the
same elements as Reynolds.318 These elements would not help domestic violence
prosecutions since the prior cross-examination requirement would still need to be
met.

31 9

In addition to the common-law forfeiture rule for the Confrontation Clause,
there is also a hearsay forfeiture doctrine codified into Federal Rule of Evidence
("FRE") 804(b)(6). FRE 804(b)(6) states that forfeiture by wrongdoing provides
308

Id. at 2280; Meier, supra note 221, at 24-25; Raeder, supra note 267, at 361-62 (noting that

studies indicate a "high percentage of physical and economic threats" were made to victims who
cooperated with the police).
309 Meier, supra note 221, at 24. Forfeiture could be particularly significant in Wyoming since
it currently ranks second in the U.S. in the number of women being killed by a person she knew.
VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2004 HOMICIDE DATA 21

(2006), at http://www.vpc.org/press/0609wmmw.htm (last visited on March 8, 2007) (reporting
that 2.39 women per 100,000 were killed in Wyoming in 2004; a total of six women were killed
in Wyoming).
310 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
311

Id. ("[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing

silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce.
While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to
refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system.").
312 Id; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
313 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 451.

314 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 451.
315 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 451.
31"Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 160-61; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 451.
317 Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 451.
38 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006) ("We take no position on the standards
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture.").
319See Lininger, supra note 102, at 783.
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an exception under the hearsay rules. 32" A statement can be admitted into evidence under hearsay rules if the proponent proves the other party secured the
"
witness' unavailability.32
' In drafting the rule, the Rules Committee intended to
codify the widely-recognized principle and create a formalized response to actions
challenging the criminal justice system.2 2 The Court did not decide whether this
stringent requirement of witness unavailability applied, although some suggest
323
that FRE 804(b)(6) will affect the forfeiture guidelines.
In addition to what the elements and standard of proof will be, many practical
questions remain.3 24 If the threat or intimidation occurred before the arrest, the
court may or may not consider the threat.3 25 A court will have to decide whether
to measure threats and intimidation by a subjective or objective test.3 26 A court
must also decide what conduct by the defendant would invoke the forfeiture
doctrine.3 2 7 History of abuse, a particular incident or statement, or an abnormal
threat that has been a warning in the past may all influence a court's decision.3 28 In
addition, a court will be faced with situations where it will have to decide the facts
when the victim is unable to testify 29 Even if the prosecutor proves forfeiture, the
330
court may still have to determine the scope of admissible hearsay.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington took the opportunity to
clarify what constitutes a "testimonial" statement under Crawford by classifying
statements gathered in police interrogations as testimonial or non-testimonial. The
"primary purpose test" adopted by the Court requires classificatiofi of a statement
to the police according to the main purpose for which the statement was collected: emergency assistance or an investigation of possible past crimes. Although
the test is a step forward in defining what is testimonial, it is a step backward in
320 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) ("The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-

ant is unavailable as a witness: ... Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability
of the declarant as a witness.").
321 Id.The elements are generally thought to include proving the unavailability of the expected
witness, intent of the defendant to prevent the testimony, and the defendant's act caused the witness's
unavailability. King-Ries, supra note 256, at 454-55.
322FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note; King-Ries, supra note 256, at 452.
323

King-Ries, supra note 256, at 450.
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Meier, supra note 221, at 24-25.

325

Id.at 24.

326

Id.; Friedman, supra note 251, at 5; Lininger, supra note 237, at 31.

327

Meier, supra note 221, at 24.

328Id.
329

Id.at 26.

330

Id. at 24, 26.
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domestic violence prosecutions where statements by victims after an emergency
has ended would be subject to the full protection of the Confrontation Clause. In
domestic violence cases where victims frequently recant or fail to appear at trial,
prosecutors will now face the task of trying to prove cases without the benefit of
police testimony. Even if the victim continues to cooperate, the prosecutor will
have to require the victim to testify against the accused despite concerns for the
victim's safety.
Domestic violence is prevalent in our society and without an effective way
for courts and prosecutors to deal with the problems, it is likely the violence
will continue and may become worse. In fact, domestic violence prosecutions
reportedly have been drastically curtailed since Crawford.331 If a perpetrator of
domestic violence knows that the charges will be dropped if the victim recants
or changes her story, it is likely that more pressure will be put on the victim to
do just that. The Court suggests the forfeiture doctrine to be the saving grace in
domestic violence cases, but did not lay out clear guidelines. There are likely to
be similar evidentiary problems in proving threats and intimidation procured the
witness's unavailability without using the witness's statements. Additional guidelines will have to be developed to determine if the forfeiture doctrine could be
helpful to a prosecutor who needs the statements of an intimidated or threatened
victim to continue the case. Intervention by advocates, the prosecutor, and police
may produce evidence other than just the victim's statements to show threats
and intimidation of the victim. Although enlightening regarding the term "testimonial," Davis v. Washington dims the prospect of successful domestic violence
prosecutions.

331Raeder, supra note 47, at 25.
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